Deterrence the Third

In previous posts, Scott brings up the interesting concept of deterring terrorism in part by engaging in a form of soft deterrence that turns the terrorist networks’ own communications tools against them. As characterized, I find that I disagree with the premise that fundamentalist Muslim jihadis can be deterred in this fashion for any meaningful length of time; however, I also believe that the idea of soft deterrence deserves further exploration as a concept.

The concept of soft deterrence against operational jihadis is flawed because it is so easily subverted by the jihadis themselves through the very kinds of countermeasures businesses and websites use every day to prevent the same kind of disinformation on their own networks. As part of a far larger countermeasure against jihadis, soft deterrence is a useful tool, but it will never be a tool that can be used alone.

This tool, however, can be an incredibly useful one if applied to a different part of the equation. As I have mentioned several times on this weblog, one of the goals that must be achieved in order to defeat fundamentalist Muslim jihadism is to deny the enemy a pool of recruits to recruit from. As David has pointed out previously on this weblog, there is a difference between a fundamentalist and a jihadi, and I believe that soft deterrence focused at that difference can work powerfully toward destabilizing the recruit pool using the very same methods being focused on active jihadis.

Despite the current more effective use of the media by the jihadis, the United States actually enjoys a significant advantage in the potential use of media targeted at fundamentalists who have not yet become jihadis. The existing problem is that advantage has not yet been employed. A focused effort on the part of the United States to target potential jihadis with an avalanche of counter information could help fatally destabilize the recruit pool, thereby denying active jihadis the ability to replace those lost to other, more active means.

Essentially, this means a widespread and focused advertising campaign focused at fundamentalist Muslims, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and places where people of those nations congregate designed to convince them that jihad does not further their goals of spreading Islam. If the United States cannot accomplish such a task, then what nation can?

In this way, I believe the tool of soft deterrence can be effective against jihadis, not by deterring the jihadis themselves, but by preventing them from being able to find more.